MACHINE LEARNING EVIDENCE: ADMISSIBILITY AND WEIGHT
Patrick W. Nutter*
INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is gaining traction in legal practice. How
prosecutors prioritize which crimes to prosecute,1 sift through mountains of
documents,2 and establish reasonable suspicion3 can all reasonably be
expected to change with coming AI technologies. While lawyers need not
attain expert-level knowledge of these processes, some competency in
concepts and vocabulary will be essential, in the same manner it has been
with other sciences, like statistical evidence or DNA analysis. In that vein,
this Comment aims to give attorneys a much-needed look inside the “black
box” of one emerging type of AI technology, machine learning. With at least
some familiarity with how machine learning works, attorneys can begin to
formulate questions and strategies when that kind of technology produces
substantive evidence at trial. These include potential issues under the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments as well as the Federal Rules of Evidence, none of
which, I argue, would categorically bar machine learning evidence. After
establishing that machine learning evidence is admissible, I explain how
counsel for both sides must be aware of the significant issues with machine
learning that nonetheless could affect the weight such evidence is assigned by
the trier of fact.
Machine learning refers to a process in which a “machine has been
‘trained’ through exposure to a large quantity of data and infers a rule from
the patterns it observes.”4 The technology, once only theoretical, is now
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See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Prosecution, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 732 (2016)
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responsible for many tasks in daily digital life. For instance, machine learning
is at work when Facebook automatically recognizes a user in a photo5 or
when an email client automatically routes spam to the appropriate folder.6
For many litigators, it will only be a matter of time before they first
encounter a creative opposing counsel who wishes to admit machine learning
output into evidence. When that happens, both sides in the interests of
clients—and the court in the interest of the law itself—must be equipped with
certain questions and skepticism. This Comment aims to look ahead to
possible evidentiary issues when, not if, the output of machine learning
algorithms is used as substantive evidence in criminal prosecution.
In the very near future, AI software will affect criminal and civil litigation
in at least three significant ways. First, AI will pose the critical question of
whether and to what extent the decision of the algorithm exposes the user to
liability.7 For example, in the employment context, when an algorithm prescreens resumes and, not by intentional design, discounts the resumes of
women or minorities, is the employer liable for discrimination?8 Or, since
the technology will soon be deployed on police body cameras,9 could realtime object recognition software perhaps assist an officer by identifying
whether a gun or a smartphone is in the suspect’s hand, and what liability
might exist if the algorithm decided incorrectly?10 Second, AI will also alter
predictive technologies in the criminal justice system, such as ones that may
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See Daniel Terdiman, Facebook’s Image-Recognition Tech Is Teaching 40,000 Images a Second to Understand
Context, FAST CO., (June 8, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40428910/facebooks-imagerecognition-tech-is-teaching-40000-images-a-second-to-understand-context (“For [Facebook’s]
1.94 billion monthly users, artificial intelligence and machine learning are behind the ability to
quickly surface meaningful baby pictures, vacation selfies, and pet action photos.”).
See Surden, supra note 2, at 90–93 (discussing email spam filters as an example of machine learning).
See generally Rebecca J. Krystosek, The Algorithm Made Me Do It and Other Bad Excuses: Upholding
Traditional Liability Principles for Algorithm-caused Harm, MINN. L. REV. DE NOVO (May 17, 2017),
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/2017/05/the-algorithm-made-me-do-it-and-other-badexcuses/ (discussing various forms of legal liability for the actions and decisions of algorithms).
See Hannah Devlin, AI Programs Exhibit Racial and Gender Biases, Research Reveals, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13,
2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/13/ai-programs-exhibitracist-and-sexist-biases-research-reveals (“One previous study showed that an identical CV is 50%
more likely to result in an interview invitation if the candidate’s name is European American than
if it is African American. The latest results suggest that algorithms, unless explicitly programmed
to address this, will be riddled with the same social prejudices.”).
See Drew Harwell, Facial Recognition May Be Coming to a Police Body Camera Near You, WASH. POST
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/26/facialrecognition-may-be-coming-to-a-police-body-camera-near-you/?utm_term=.46192f40bfda
(describing the growing use of facial recognition software in police body cameras).
See, e.g., Eric Levenson, Madison Park & Darran Simon, Sacramento Police Shot Man Holding Cellphone
in His Grandmother’s Yard, CNN (Mar. 22, 2018) https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/22/us/
sacramento-police-shooting/index.html (reporting a shooting of a man holding a cell phone by an
officer who believed the phone to be a gun).
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aid in investigations, establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause,11 or
assist sentencing judges in estimating a defendant’s chances of reoffending.12
Third, AI can aid the legal reasoning process itself. For example, to
understand the original public meaning of the Second Amendment’s “bear
arms,” it would surely be illuminating to examine a corpus of 1.3 billion
words—from books, handwritten diaries, newspapers, etc.—for the use of
the phrase “bear arms” in the centuries surrounding the Amendment’s
drafting, a task that has been accomplished with AI technology.13
Despite the important developments and commentary on those evolving
issues, this Comment focuses specifically on using the conclusions of machine
learning processes as substantive evidence in litigation. For instance, in a
blurry surveillance video or an unclear audio recording, the naked eye and
ear may be insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but certain
recognition algorithms could do so easily. Lip-reading algorithms might tell
jurors what was said on video where there is no audio available.14 A machine
might construct an estimation of a perpetrator’s face from only a DNA
sample,15 or in other DNA analysis of corrupted samples.16
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See generally Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 871 (2016) (discussing the role of machine learning will play in the Fourth
Amendment context).
See Ellora Thadaney Israni, Opinion, When an Algorithm Helps Send You to Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
26,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/opinion/algorithm-compas-sentencingbias.html (criticizing the use of a risk assessment algorithm as a factor in a criminal sentencing).
See Johnson, Arms and the Man, ECONOMIST (June 9, 2018), http://media.economist.com/news/
books-and-arts/21743640-big-data-can-help-clarify-meaning-second-amendment-judges-shouldpay (advocating for the use of “digital corpora” to determine the meaning of the term “bear arms”).
See Jamie Condliffe, AI Has Beaten Humans at Lip-reading, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 21, 2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602949/ai-has-beaten-humans-at-lip-reading/ (describing
two studies in which artificial intelligence vastly outperformed humans at lip-reading).
The leading company offering this particular service is Virginia-based Parabon Nanolabs, which uses
machine learning processes to predict visible traits (e.g., facial structure, eye and hair color, etc.) from
DNA samples alone.
See How DNA Phenotyping Works, PARABON NANOLABS,
https://snapshot.parabon-nanolabs.com/#phenotyping-how (last visited Mar. 7, 2018) (“Parabon’s
scientists use machine learning algorithms to combine the selected set of SNPs into a complex
mathematical equation for the genetic architecture of the trait.”). Parabon’s service has already been
used in several investigations. See, e.g., Alicia Victoria Lozano, Montgomery County Officials Use DNA
Samples to Create Picture of Rape Suspect, NBC PHILA. (Jan. 16, 2018, 3:12 PM),
https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Montgomery-County-Phenotyping-DNA-TestingRape-Suspect-Norristown-Farm-Park-469588793.html (last updated Jan. 16, 2018, 7:29
PM)(discussing the Montgomery County District Attorney Office’s use of Parabon’s DNA technology
to create an illustration of a suspected rapist). It is, however, not without critics. One, Peter Claes,
an expert in craniofacial morphometrics at the University of Leuven, thinks that in some cases the
images have virtually no value. To him, one image “just looked like an average black man. It didn’t
have any characteristic features. That reconstruction didn’t give any more information than the
genetic background that they listed. This prediction is hardly specific so it doesn’t really focus on an
individual . . . .” Howard Wolinsky, CSI on Steroids, 16 EMBO REP. 782, 782 (2015).
See Under the Microscope—Jonathan Adelman & Michael Marciano, ISHI (Sept. 21, 2017),
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The legal issues of broadly defined “machine evidence” have been
extensively cataloged and discussed, especially in the Fourth and Sixth
Amendment contexts.17 Such machine evidence includes radar guns,
breathalyzers, DNA analysis software, GPS, and risk assessment software.18
However, few have explored machine learning as a distinct species of
machine evidence, distinct even from evidence produced using traditional
computer programs,19 with its own vocabulary and unique set of issues.
Importantly, that lack of analysis means there has been little exploration of
the legal pitfalls of machine learning—the ways in which it goes awry, is
misused, or is misinterpreted. In some ways, the reliability issues of machine
learning algorithms are similar to those already cataloged with respect to
typical computer software; but in other critical respects, machine learning
poses unique questions of reliability. Like other machine evidence has done
in the past, machine learning will give rise to new evidentiary issues.
Ultimately, however, I argue that in most cases machine learning evidence
will not be barred by either the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.
Part I begins with an overview of how courts currently treat software
output as evidence. Machine learning is revolutionary in its applications and
capabilities, though, with respect to its potential uses in prosecution, it is
functionally similar to traditional software: data go in and conclusions come
out. In between, there is a “black box” of calculations that few in the
courtroom understand. Part II explains how machine learning is distinct from
traditional computer software in process and appropriate uses. Part III offers
an explanation of how contemporary machine learning typically works.
In Part IV, I analyze machine learning evidence under Federal Rule 702
and its Daubert criteria and find that machine learning would surely meet the
requirements for admissible expert testimony.
In Part V, I argue that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments pose no
categorical barrier to machine learning evidence but limit how it may be
introduced. I argue first that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
does not bar machine learning evidence and, second, that pursuant to the
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, machine learning evidence will
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https://www.ishinews.com/under-the-microscope-michael-marciano_jonathan_adelman/
(interviewing two experts on the issues of DNA mixture interpretation).
See generally Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972 (2017) [hereinafter Roth, Testimony]
(attempting to “offer a coherent framework for conceptualizing and regulating machine evidence”);
Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245 (2016) [hereinafter Roth, Trial] (discussing the
rise of machines in criminal adjudication).
Roth, Testimony, supra note 17, at 2015, 2025, 2027.
See Christian Chessman, Note, A “Source” of Error: Computer Code, Criminal Defendants, and the
Constitution, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 183–84 (2017) (discussing evidentiary issues with respect to
conventional computer software).
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likely only be admissible in the form of expert testimony.
In Part VI, having concluded that machine learning evidence will likely
be admissible in at least some cases, I emphasize that there are significant
problems with the weight such evidence should be assigned by the finder of
fact because of machine learning’s unique unexplainability, that is, in many
cases it is impossible to explain how a machine learning algorithm makes a
particular conclusion.
I. MACHINE EVIDENCE AND BLACK BOXES
Evidence is “[s]omething (including testimony, documents, and tangible
objects) that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact” or,
more generally, “anything presented to the senses and offered to prove the
existence or nonexistence of a fact.”20 In a criminal proceeding, evidence,
and the inferences that logically can be drawn from it, must ultimately
support the factfinder’s conclusion of guilt.21 The primary purpose of rules
of evidence is to narrow the evidence offered at trial, sometimes to limit
evidence to what is relevant and probative, other times to prevent the
factfinder from drawing illogical conclusions or to minimize the possibility of
unfair prejudice to the accused.22 Where the Federal Rules of Evidence
apply, they explicitly instruct courts to construe them in a manner that will
“administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and
delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of
ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”23
How guilt may be established has evolved over the course of the AngloAmerican legal tradition. Whereas documentary evidence and human
testimony have been mainstays of criminal proceedings, other forms of
evidence have unfortunately come and thankfully gone, including
phrenology24 and “spectral evidence” (i.e., the “testimony of the bewitched
20
21
22
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Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
1 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1:2 (15th ed. 1997)
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 102.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Cesare Lambroso formulated and evangelized his own
“scientific” classification of criminals and testified often as an expert witness:
He noticed in the skull of a murderer an anomalous depression characteristic of lower
species, such as dogs. . . . Lombroso speculated that such a skull reflected an underlying
brain abnormality of an atavistic nature. That is, perhaps the brain of the murderer
suggested a more primitive development of a lower species. Lombroso gathered large
quantities of data from measurements on criminals and proposed that certain criminals
represented a distinct species, homo delinquens. As his reputation grew, others also subscribed
to his theory that at least some criminals are born, not made, and criminal types could be
identified by the shapes of their skulls. Lombroso was called upon as an expert witness on
numerous occasions to testify as to whether a defendant was of a criminal disposition.
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that an accused person’s spectral shape appeared to them at a time when
their physical body was elsewhere”).25 “Machine evidence,” however, has
come and stayed. Over the past 150 years, the “silent testimony of
instruments” has supplemented the testimony of humans.26 Only rarely have
courts found that science had progressed too far beyond what the given rules
of evidence can comfortably handle and thus resisted a new technology as
evidence.27 Instead, the law has typically been receptive to new scientific
discoveries and their potential evidentiary uses.28
Overall, “this shift from human- to machine-generated proof has, on the
whole, enhanced accuracy and objectivity in fact finding.”29 And yet, for all
its advantages, machine testimony is not without risks, such as when society
determines that it must err on the side of overinclusion and reduction of false
negatives, notwithstanding such a policy’s inherent risk that machines will
erroneously inculpate the innocent.30 This Comment highlights that risk, as
well as another: that machines are improperly afforded a presumption of
reliability, even when jurors cannot peer into the “black box” that is
providing them with evidence. “These ‘black box’ processes, because of their
mechanical appearance and apparently simple output, have a veneer of
objectivity and certainty.”31 However, even though these machines appear
neutral, they are necessarily the product of human creation, and therefore
human judgment, with its risk of bias and tendency to make mistakes.32
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Richard L. Elliott, Neuropsychiatry in the Courtroom, 62 MERCER L. REV. 933, 939 (2011).
See Sarah Kruetter, The Devil’s Specter: Spectral Evidence and the Salem Witchcraft Crisis, 2 SPECTRUM: A
SCHOLARS DAY J., 1, 1 (2011) (“This was a key point of proof delivered against accused witches at
Salem in 1692. Spectral evidence is impossible to prove and courts used it with caution in court
cases prior to Salem. . . . [Y]et nearly every case during the Salem outbreak featured this
evidence.”).
Roth, Trial, supra note 17, at 1253 (quoting MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 143
(1997)); see id. (“‘[S]cientific gadgets in the law of evidence’ and interpretive forensic and diagnostic
software has reduced the role of both percipient and human witnesses in proving guilt.” (quoting Note,
Scientific Gadgets in the Law of Evidence, 53 HARV. L. REV. 285, 285 (1939) [hereinafter Scientific Gadgets])).
See, e.g., People v. Offermann, 125 N.Y.S.2d 179, 185 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953) (explaining that the case
was the very first to use a radar gun reading as evidence and holding that the New York legislature
should enact new rules of evidence to explicitly allow for its admissibility).
Scientific Gadgets, supra note 26, at 285 (“It is the perennial boast of the law that in the ascertainment
of facts it will avail itself of any accepted scientific discovery.”).
Roth, Testimony, supra note 17, at 1976.
Roth, Trial, supra note 17, at 1269 (“[M]echanization has arisen in criminal justice in an
unbalanced way, reflecting the focus of law enforcement, interest groups, and lawmakers on
reducing a particular species of inaccuracy: false negatives.”).
Id. at 1269–70.
Id. at 1270 (“In truth, these processes all have hidden subjectivities and errors that often go
unrecognized and unchecked, thus potentially ‘facilitat[ing] the masking of illegitimate or illegal
discrimination behind layers upon layers of mirrors and proxies.’ (quoting Omer Tene & Jules
Polonetsky, Judged by the Tin Man: Individual Rights in the Age of Big Data, 11 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 351, 358 (2013)).
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Even so, machine evidence—and, for the purposes of this Comment,
specifically evidence derived from algorithmic software processes—supports
guilty verdicts daily. By their conduct, courts have expressed a tolerance for
some level of both ignorance and risk in machine evidence: ignorance in how
these processes work, and risk that they might not “get it right” every time.
For example, photographic evidence, breathalyzer readouts, and DNA tests
have been admitted into evidence for decades, in spite of their risk of error
in programming or hidden reliance on subjective human judgment.33 In
recent cases involving TrueAllele, a probabilistic genotypic software,34 the
black box has only gotten blacker, and courts have yet to reject its use on that
basis. Indeed, TrueAllele’s most marketable feature is the assumptions it uses
to remove user (that is, lab technician) judgment from the DNA match
determination, effectively promoting its “veneer of objectivity and certainty.”
This merely passes the buck, however, as the user’s judgment is only
substituted for that of the initial programmer of the software, who, as of now,
has never revealed his complete methodology and has not been subject to
cross-examination.35
Overall, then, courts have long been comfortable with machine evidence
whose processes are not entirely disclosed to, or understood by, the judge,
jury, parties, or counsel. And it is likely that courts will find similar comfort
in machine learning processes.
II. WHAT MACHINE LEARNING IS
A. Machine Learning in the Artificial Intelligence Context
Technologies that claim the artificial intelligence label are proliferating in
number and application. A 2016 Stanford University report lists no fewer than
eight broad sectors that researchers are hoping to transform with AI, including
critical areas like education, healthcare, transportation, the workplace, and
public safety.36 Yet for many AI researchers, listing even eight sectors is too
33
34

35
36

Id. at 1272–73 (discussing the potential errors and human judgments that inform how photographs,
breathalyzers, and DNA tests operate).
Probabilistic genotyping “uses complex mathematical formulas to examine the statistical likelihood
that a certain genotype comes from one individual over another.” Jessica Pishko, The Impenetrable
Program Transforming How Courts Treat DNA Evidence, WIRED (Nov. 29, 2017, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/trueallele-software-transforming-how-courts-treat-dna-evidence.
Roth, Trial, supra note 17, at 1273–74.
COMMITTEE OF THE ONE HUNDRED YEAR STUDY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, STUDY
PANEL, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030, at 4 (2016).
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conservative: AI will simply transform everything.37 To them, that future is
“when,” not “if.” The necessary technologies are already here, but their wider
applications are presently constrained only by human imagination,
management,38 and the sheer lack of people working in the field.39
AI has infected the discourse of business and culture perhaps because it
seems to refer to so many things. Firms increasingly market themselves as
incorporating AI into their products and services,40 though sometimes they
use the AI label inaccurately, applying its traditional computational methods
only for more marketing heft.41 More often, the term is used in platitudes
about market “disruption,”42 and in fact “AI” may now be used so loosely
that it is losing its meaning—what one Georgia Institute of Technology
professor calls “AI deflation.”43 Even as a field of study, artificial intelligence
has hazy boundaries, as it refers to many disparate specialties like robotics,44
transportation,45
human-computer interaction,46
and predictive
47
technologies. As such, one researcher comments, “the field doesn’t have a
37
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Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, The Business of Artificial Intelligence, HARV. BUS. REV., July
2017 at 3, 4 (“The effects of AI will be magnified in the coming decade, as manufacturing, retailing,
transportation, finance, health care, law, advertising, insurance, entertainment, education, and
virtually every other industry transform their core processes and business models to take advantage
of machine learning.”).
Id. (“The bottleneck now is in management, implementation, and business imagination.”).
Cade Metz, Tech Giants Are Paying Huge Salaries for Scarce A.I. Talent, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/technology/artificial-intelligence-expertssalaries.html?_r=1 (“In the entire world, fewer than 10,000 people have the skills necessary to tackle
serious artificial intelligence research . . . .”).
See, e.g., Kate Kaye, Is This AI or BS? Artificial Intelligence Is All the Rage, but Sometimes It’s Just Hype,
ADAGE (Apr. 19, 2017), http://adage.com/article/datadriven-marketing/ai-bs/308718/
(discussing the marketing power and oversimplification of the buzzwords “artificial intelligence”).
Brynjolfsson & McAffee, supra note37, at 4 (“Simply calling a dating site ‘AI-powered,’ for example,
doesn’t make it any more effective, but it might help with fundraising.”).
See e.g., The AI Disruption Bundle: The Guide to Understanding How Artificial Intelligence Is Impacting the World,
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 6, 2017, 3:30 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/understanding-artificialintelligence-impacting-world-2017-10 (describing artificial intelligence as disruptive).
Ian Bogost, ‘Artificial Intelligence’ Has Become Meaningless, ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/what-is-artificial-intelligence/
518547/ (referencing artificial intelligence robots).
Felix Ingrand & Mark Ghallab, Robotics and Artificial Intelligence: A Perspective on Deliberation Functions,
AI COMMUNICATIONS, IOS PRESS (Apr. 3, 2015), https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal01138117/document (discussing AI and robotics).
See generally Sebastian Ramos et al., Detecting Unexpected Obstacles for Self-Driving Cars: Fusing Deep
Learning and Geometric Modeling, ARXIV.ORG (Dec. 20, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1612.06573.pdf
(discussing AI and cars).
See generally Jose Maria Garcia-Garcia et al., Emotional Detection: A Technology Review, RESEARCHGATE
(2017),
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jose_Garcia-Garcia4/publication/
320359659_Emotion_detection_a_technology_review/links/59e620a2a6fdcc3dcd33e82f/Emotio
n-detection-a-technology-review.pdf (discussing human-AI interactions).
See generally David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go Without Human Knowledge, 550 NATURE 356

Feb. 2019]

MACHINE LEARNING EVIDENCE: ADMISSIBILITY AND WEIGHT

927

coherent theory.”48
B. Machine Learning Versus Traditional Computer Programming
In previous decades, machines operated according to rules that humans
painstakingly programmed by hand, “writing code of exactly what [they]
want[ed] the machine to do.”49 This method of computation powered all
the wide array of computer applications through the twentieth century, but
it could not automate the many tasks that humans do that cannot be
practically reduced to sets of rules. One such task is facial recognition. Using
the example of how he can easily recognize his mother’s face, one AI
researcher comments, “I . . . recognize it but I couldn’t really write code to
do it.”50 It is for this reason, according to Polanyi’s paradox, that there are
fundamental limits to how much knowledge humans can impart to
machines.51 More recently, however, machine learning has emerged as a
revolutionary subfield of AI because it can circumvent that limitation.
In short, machine learning refers to a program’s ability to “extract[ ]
patterns from raw data.”52 “Deep learning,” a type of machine learning, has
powered much of the recent gains in machine learning research. Deep
learning programs optimize accuracy and, over time, yield increasingly
accurate results for a given task. That is, the machine has the “ability to keep
improving its performance without humans having to explain exactly how to
accomplish” a task.53 Now, “machines learn on their own things that we
don’t know how to explain.”54 After being shown thousands or even millions
of examples,55 the machines learn patterns, correlations, and rules—

48
49
50
51

52
53
54
55

(2017) (discussing the AI AlphaGo’s use of predictive technology to master the game of Go).
Jerry
Kaplain,
AI’s
PR
Problem,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(Mar.
3,
2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603761/ais-pr-problem/.
How AI Is Already Changing Business, HBR IDEACAST (July 20, 2017), https://hbr.org/
ideacast/2017/07/how-ai-is-already-changing-business [hereinafter AI Changing Business].
Id.
See Brynjolfsson & McAffee, supra note 37, at 6; see also David H. Autor, Polanyi’s Paradox and the Shape
of Employment Growth 8 (Nat’l Burea of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20485, 2014)
(“[E]ngineers cannot program a computer to simulate a process that they (or the scientific
community at large) do not explicitly understand. This constraint is more binding than one might
initially surmise because there are many tasks that we understand tacitly and accomplish effortlessly
for which we do not know the explicit ‘rules’ or procedures.”).
IAN GOODFELLOW, YOSHUA BENGIO & AARON COURVILLE, DEEP LEARNING 2–3 (9th ed.2016).
Brynjolfsson & McAffee, supra note 37, at 4.
AI Changing Business, supra note 49.
See Yonghui Wu et al., Google’s Neural Machine Translation System: Bridging the Gap Between Human and
Machine Translation, ARXIV.ORG 1, 14 (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.08144.pdf (describing
the process of teaching a machine English to French translation using thirty-six million pairs of
sentences).
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sometimes the ones that humans use to accomplish the task but other times
ones that humans cannot perceive,56 or had not used previously.57 Indeed,
many times the programmer him- or herself cannot account for how the
machine came to a particular result, even if the result is correct.58 Tasks that
were once impossible to automate are now on par with human experts,
including not only facial recognition,59 but also skin cancer detection60 and
some types of language translation.61
With many applications emerging, and far more on the horizon, it is
inevitable that attorneys will do with machine learning what they have done
before with all manner of devices, machines, and technical software: use it to
win. Law firms are already incorporating machine learning software into
other aspects of their business, like e-discovery,62 while government
regulators have begun to use machine learning to assist in investigating fraud
and other white-collar crimes.63 Prosecutors, specifically, may find several
aspects of their work affected by machine learning, including justifying
56

57
58

59

60
61
62

63

See, e.g., Heather Murphy, Why Stanford Researchers Tried to Create a ‘Gaydar’ Machine, N. Y. TIMES (Oct.
9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/science/stanford-sexual-orientation-study.html
(using photos of gay men and straight men, an AI was able to use aspects of the human face to
predict a man’s sexual orientation with up to ninety-one percent accuracy).
Id.
Andreas Holzinger et al., What Do We Need to Build Explainable AI Systems for the Medical Domain?,
ARXIV.ORG (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.09923.pdf (“However, the central problem of
such models is that they are regarded as black-box models and even if we understand the underlying
mathematical principles of such models they lack an explicit declarative knowledge representation,
hence we have difficulty in generating the underlying explanatory structures.”).
See generally Will Knight, Paying with Your Face, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar.–Apr. 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603494/10-breakthrough-technologies-2017-paying-withyour-face/ (detailing how researchers have shown their programs rival most humans in ability to
recognize faces).
Andre Esteva et al., Dermatologist-level Classification of Skin Cancer with Deep Neural Networks, 542
NATURE 115, 115 (2017).
Wu et al., supra note 55, at 19.
See Avaneesh Marwaha, Seven Benefits of Artificial Intelligence for Law Firms, LAW TECH. TODAY (July
13, 2017), http://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2017/07/seven-benefits-artificial-intelligencelaw-firms/; Catalyst, How AI and Machine-Learning Tools Lighten the eDiscovery Load, ABOVE L. (May
17, 2017, 3:02 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/05/how-ai-and-machine-learning-toolslighten-the-ediscovery-load/; Julie Sobowale, How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the Legal
Profession, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 2016),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
how_artificial_intelligence_is_transforming_the_legal_profession (all outlining how AI is used to
save time in discovery).
Gerard Hoberg & Craig Lewis, Do Fraudulent Firms Produce Abnormal Disclosure? 1–3 (Vand. Owen
Graduate Sch. of Mgmt. Research Paper No. 2298302, 2015), (using a topic modeling technique
that discovers clusters of text to predict whether a firm’s SEC disclosure shows signs that the firm is
committing fraud); Scott W. Bauguess, The Hope and Limitations of Machine Learning in Market Risk
Assessment, SEC (Mar. 6, 2015), https://cfe.columbia.edu/files/seasieor/center-financialengineering/presentations/MachineLearningSECRiskAssessment030615public.pdf
(discussing
how the SEC could produce a model to help detect illicit behavior).
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searches64 and determining which crimes to prosecute.65 Though machine
learning has not yet been widely used to produce evidence itself, the
capability, accessibility, and incentives to do so already exist.
III. HOW MACHINE LEARNING WORKS
A machine learning program extracts useful patterns out of a large
collection of data to perform a certain task.66 To be clear, the learning itself
is not the ultimate goal, but rather the means to achieve that goal.67
“Learning,” in this context, refers to an improvement in performance of the
task over time.68 Practicing attorneys can at least grasp the fundamentals of
machine learning by becoming familiar with the tasks these programs can
perform and the processes by which the machines “learn.”
A. Tasks
Machines can learn to perform many tasks. The most common include
classification (e.g., image or facial recognition), classification with missing
inputs (e.g., recognizing an object or face from a corrupted or incomplete
image), regression (e.g., predicting a numerical value given certain
conditions), transcription (e.g., speech-to-text software), machine translation
(e.g., translating from one natural language to another), structured output
(e.g., image recognition in which the machine can describe the image in
grammatical sentences), anomaly detection (e.g., credit card fraud detection),
synthesis and sampling (i.e., the machine generates new examples similar to
the examples it has learned), imputation of missing values (i.e., predicting
certain data points given other data points), and denoising (i.e., match an
inputted “corrupted” exampled to a “clean” example).69
Many of the emerging or possible evidentiary applications of machine
learning fall into these general categories. For instance, risk assessment in
parole hearings could be accomplished with a regression analysis.70 Facial
recognition could identify a defendant even with video or photographic
64
65
66
67
68

69
70

See generally Rich, supra note 11 (discussing machine learning and the Fourth Amendment).
See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 732 (“[T]he predictive prosecution model shifts the identification of
problem areas from the street cops to the lawyers.”).
Kaplan, supra note 48.
See GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 52, at 97 (explaining that once a specific task is defined, like
walking, learning how to do the task is not the task itself, but gaining the means to perform the task).
Id. (“A computer program is said to learn from experience E with respect to some class of tasks T
and performance measure P, if its performance at tasks in T, as measured by P, improves with
experience E.”).
Id. at 98–101.
Lacambra, supra note 3.

930

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:3

evidence in less than ideal circumstances.71 Body recognition algorithms
may achieve the same where no facial images are captured.72 Anomaly
detection can scan corporate filings or other behavior to assess evidence of
wrongdoing.73 It impossible to catalog all the ways in which machine
learning may produce evidence, especially as the technology further evolves,
but suffice to say these are only among the presently foreseeable.
B. Learning
To perform the task, the machine first must learn from examples, which
are simply a collection of quantified features.74 When the data are already
numerical, quantification is straightforward. In other situations, how the
data is quantified is not immediately obvious or can reflect programmer
judgment. For instance, an image of a face is quantified on the basis of pixel
values that a screen would use to display the image.75 Once the data have
been translated into numbers, the programmer must take some of the data
whose properties are already known, referred to as “training data,”76 and
teach the machine the rules or associations that will be useful when the
machine later analyzes new data whose properties are not already known.
This process is referred to as “supervised learning.”77
To echo the facial recognition example above,78 a programmer at this
stage will feed a set of pictures of her mother (which the programmer knows
to be of her mother) into the machine. Critically, the programmer explicitly
tells the machine to associate the images of that face with her mother, such
as by labeling each image with the mother’s name. At this point, the machine
knows these images are of the mother not by any inference or computation,
but because the programmer has told the machine explicitly. Then, the
machine analyzes the pictures of the mother’s face and, on its own,
establishes other associations, correlations, or rules that will enable it to

71
72

73
74

75
76
77
78

See John Nawara, Machine Learning: Face Recognition Technology Evidence in Criminal Trials, 49 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 601, 608–09 (2011).
Chikahito Nakajima et al, Full-body Person Recognition System, 36 PATTERN RECOGNITION 1997,
1997 (2003) (“We describe a system that learns from examples to recognize person in images taken
indoors.”).
Hoberg & Lewis, supra note 63; Bauguess, supra note 63.
See GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 52, at 97 (defining example as “a collection of features that
have been quantitatively measured from some object or event that we want the machine learning
system to process”); id. at 103 (explaining how “supervised learning” in deep learning computers
uses sets of data curated and labeled for the neural network to experience).
Id. at 97 (“[T]he features of an image are usually the values of the pixels in the image.”).
Id. at 119.
Id. at 103. Note that these categories are not clearly defined and may blur at the edges.
See Nawara, supra note 71.
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recognize the programmer’s mother in new images it has not seen before.
For example, the machine might establish rules about skin tone, distance of
the eyes from one another, and height or width of the face.79
Once the machine has learned from the training data and deduced some
set of rules, its performance is then tested and refined on a separate pool of
testing data, called the “test set,” the properties of which are also known.80
The programmer then assesses the error rates of the machine’s accuracy and
makes adjustments. In the present example, our programmer would at this
stage feed into the machine new images of her mother that the machine has
not seen before and test how well it can identify the mother. When the
machine has reached some level of accuracy that the researcher feels is
satisfactory, it is used to analyze real world data. Ideally, the machine should
be able to identify the mother in any image where she is present, including
situations of various image quality, bright or dark lighting, different angles, or
no matter the mother’s hair style, presence or absence of makeup, differences
in outfit, or other situations where her appearance is slightly different.
IV. ADMISSIBILITY UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702
When machine learning output is used as substantive evidence in
litigation in federal court, it most likely will be in the form expert testimony
governed by Rule 702 and Daubert, though if or how it may be used in state
courts depends on each state’s rules of evidence.81 Rule 702 governs the
79

80
81

See GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 52, at 8 (explaining that “deep learning” is a type of machine
learning that is often used in facial recognition, but is used in other contexts, as well. In general,
deep learning is a process of representing abstract concepts in terms of simpler concepts.); see also
id. at 6 (indicating an abstract concept, like a human face, can be represented as a particular
arrangement of simpler concepts, like lines, contours, and edges); id. at 8 (describing a typical deep
learning algorithm would analyze an image first for a series of lines (a relatively simple analysis),
then for a series of connected and contoured lines (a slightly more complex analysis building upon
the first), and finally assess if the present arrangement of lines, contours, and edges matches the
arrangement that the algorithm had learned corresponds to a face).
Id. at 106 (explaining how accuracy of the performance data is tested).
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not govern all the ways in which machine learning will likely
infect litigation, such as investigations, bail determinations, and sentencing. See Robin A. Smith,
Opening the Lid on Criminal Sentencing Software, DUKE TODAY (July 19, 2017),
https://today.duke.edu/2017/07/opening-lid-criminal-sentencing-software (explaining the blackbox software of sentencing as a mystery); Laura Smith-Spark, Voice, Words May Provide Key Clues About
James Foley’s Killer, CNN (Aug. 24, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/22/world/europe/
british-jihadi-hunt/index.html (last updated Aug. 24, 2014, 6;07 AM)) (discussing the use of voice
identification software to identify a hooded ISIS militant); Eric Westervelt, Did a Bail Reform Algorithm
Contribute to This San Francisco Man’s Murder?, NPR (Aug. 18, 2017, 2:00 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/08/18/543976003/did-a-bail-reform-algorithm-contribute-to-thissan-francisco-man-s-murder) (discussing a computer algorithm deciding the fate of a defendant).
Without the schema of the Federal Rules of Evidence in place, it is safe to assume that those areas
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admissibility of expert testimony in federal court.82 For a qualified expert to
testify, the proponent must show that the testimony will assist the trier of fact,
that the opinion is based on sufficient facts or data, that the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and that the principles and
methods are reliably applied to the instant case.83 When the judge
determines the admissibility of expert testimony, she is only making “a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”84 The focus is
not on the conclusions that the methods generate.85
Machine learning output is likely admissible under both under Daubert
and the text of Rule 702 itself. However, the exact manner in which the
algorithm was created or the way it would be used at trial may, in some cases,
render it inadmissible.
A. Daubert Criteria
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court established a
general framework for federal courts to assess whether expert testimony is
the product of “reliable principles and methods” under Rule 702.86 The
Court lists four non-dispositive considerations, none of which categorically
bar machine learning evidence. First, whether the theory or technique can
be or has been tested; second, whether the theory or technique has been
subject to peer-reviewed publication; third, the existence of error rates; and
fourth, whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance in the

82

83
84
85
86

are the first where we would see machine learning at work, especially since today those areas are
seeing non-machine learning algorithms grow in popularity and legal legitimacy. See, e.g., State v.
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 752–53 (Wis. 2016) (describing the use of risk assessment algorithms in
the context of probation, parole, and sentencing); Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 575 (Ind.
2010) (concluding that trial judges “are encouraged” to use risk assessment software to inform
sentencing decisions).
Federal Rules of Evidence 702 reads:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c)
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
Id.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993).
Id. at 595 (stating the focus is solely on principles and methodology).
Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 702(c).
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field or scientific community.87
Machine learning easily satisfies three of the four Daubert factors without
extensive discussion. Machine learning evidence would certainly meet the
testability consideration, since these processes produce results that can be
shown to be false, sometimes in spectacular ways. For instance, in 2015,
Google’s object recognition system falsely identified two African Americans
as gorillas, quickly prompting outcry and a correction to the algorithm.88
Machine learning also satisfies Daubert’s peer review consideration, since the
peer reviewed literature on it has proliferated in recent years, with some of
its scientific principles dating back to the mid-twentieth century.89 And,
machine learning enjoys general acceptance in the field or scientific
community, and practitioners are applying the technology in myriad
disciplines.90
Daubert’s requirement that the science have either known or potential
error rates,91 however, presents a more complicated analysis. Machine
learning algorithms indeed have calculable error rates, though the relevance
of these error rates to the particular situation is oftentimes questionable.
Machine learning algorithms usually have two important error rates.
The first is its test set error rate with respect to training data, which are the
examples whose properties are already known to the researcher and which
are the basis for the algorithm’s improved performance over time.92
Eventually, a second error rate captures the algorithm’s performance when
it is unleashed upon real-world examples with unknown properties.93 Both
error rates typically appear as a singular number that masks other important
statistics, like whether the algorithm is more likely to give false positives or
false negatives, an important detail that should be revealed at a Daubert
hearing or on cross examination.
Subjective programmer judgments can inform the error rate, such as
whether or not to give partial credit for a partial success,94 though in some
contexts it is difficult to assess what should be considered a success or failure

87
88

89
90
91
92
93
94

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.
Tom Simonite, When It Comes to Gorillas, Google Photos Remains Blind, WIRED (Jan. 11, 2018, 7:00
AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/when-it-comes-to-gorillas-google-photos-remains-blind/
(“In 2015, a black software developer embarrassed Google by tweeting that the company’s Photos
service had labeled photos of him with a black friend as ‘gorillas.’”).
See GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 52, at 12. (“[D]eep learning dates back to the 1940s.”).
Id. at 98–101.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (stating in the case of a scientific technique the court should consider the
potential rate of error).
See GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 52, at 102 (referring to the error rate value as “the expected
0-1 loss”).
Id.
Id.

934

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:3

in the first place. For example, in a lip-reading algorithm, is an inelegant but
understandable translation a success or a failure? And if it is only a partial
success, how partial is it? The answer, which will inform the error rates, is
ultimately a human judgment, and there may be no consistency from one
programmer to another. For purely binary outcomes, like the task of
identifying a defendant, no such thing as partial success would exist, because
the individual the algorithm is identifying in a video, photo, or recording
either is the defendant or is not.
Additionally, a machine’s overall stated error rate may mask a higher rate
of error when it draws conclusions about a defendant who does not share
characteristics with the initial training data. For instance, an error rate for a
machine that has been trained on racially diverse data may be less reliable
for a single racial category than others. In one facial recognition application,
“the software is right 99 percent of the time” but only “[w]hen the person in
the photo is a white man.”95 “But the darker the skin, the more errors arise—
up to nearly 35 percent for images of darker skinned women.”96 Yet,
oftentimes today’s machines are not trained on racially diverse data, which
presents other problems for how to generalize its conclusions. For instance,
one recent facial recognition system reported 97.35% accuracy but on a
dataset that turned out to be 77.5% male and 83.5% white.97 Its error rates
were never broken down by race or gender.98
Aurally, too, machines struggle with accents that are not standard
American or British. Speech recognition algorithms may vary in their
accuracy when dealing with accents from various regions. Scottish was the
most difficult for one speech recognition algorithm to understand, followed
closely by American southerners from Georgia.99 Nor are these variables
entirely independent. Sometimes the accuracy of a speech recognition
algorithm is highly correlated with race, gender, or age: “higher-pitched
voices are more difficult for speech-recognition systems” which makes them
95

96
97

98
99

Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition Is Accurate, If You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificialintelligence.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur.
Id.
Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender
Classification, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 3 (2018) (citing Hu Han & Anil K. Jain, Age,
Gender and Race Estimation from Unconstrained Face Images, MSU TECH. REP. 1, 2 (2014)).
Id. at 3 (citing Yaniv Taigman et al., Deepface: Closing the Gap to Human-level Performance in Face
Verification, 2014 IEEE CONF. COMPUTER VISION & PATTERN RECOGNITION 1701, 1701).
Johnson, In the World of Voice-recognition, Not All Accents Are Equal, ECONOMIST (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21737017-you-can-train-your-gadgetsunderstand-what-youre-saying-world (“The automatic captioning did worst with the Scottish
speakers, transcribing more than half of the words incorrectly, followed closely by American
southerners (from Georgia).”).
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less accurate overall for women and especially children.100 Multiple popular
speech recognition algorithms had similar trouble with black and mixed-race
speakers.101
Thus, the mosaic of different possible error rates presents a more
complicated picture than a single, impressively low error rate may reflect.
For this reason, machine learning evidence is particularly susceptible to
violating Rule 702(d)’s requirement that the evidence be “reliably applied the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.”102 If an algorithm has an
impressive rate of error with respect to data that bears little resemblance to
the instant defendant, then its conclusions are not being reliably applied to
the facts of the case.103
B. Problems of Data
Rule 702 requires that the proffered evidence be based on sufficient facts
or data and be the product of reliable principles and methods.104 This section
suggests several inquiries of data collection and use that may affect the
admissibility of machine learning output under 702(b) and 702(c).
1. How Large Was the Training Dataset?
Sample size is an initial inquiry that is by no means unknown to lawyers
challenging scientific evidence.105 Machine learning algorithms require very
large datasets to extract useful patterns and make accurate assessments, and
more complicated tasks require more examples to fine tune their accuracy.
For instance, text recognition (a relatively simple task) may require only a few
thousand examples, whereas language translation (an extremely complex
task) requires tens of millions of examples.106 The party seeking to admit the
evidence would want assurances that the training data is sufficiently large for
the given task, whereas the party seeking to exclude the evidence would want

100
101

102
103
104
105
106

Id. (“It also did worse with women: higher-pitched voices are more difficult for speech-recognition
systems, one reason they tend to struggle with children.”).
Id. (“In a follow-up experiment, Ms. Tatman used both YouTube and Bing Speech, made by
Microsoft, to test only American accents. Both found black and mixed-race speakers harder to
comprehend than white ones.”).
FED. R. EVID. 702(d).
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“A court may conclude that there is simply too
great an analytical gap between the data and the [expert] opinion proffered.”).
FED. R. EVID. 702(b)–(c).
See FED. JUD. CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 246 (3d ed. 2011) (pondering
the question of how large a sample size should be when lawyers are making scientific inquiries).
See Wu et al., supra note 55 (teaching a machine English to French translation using thirty-six million
pairs of sentences).
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to inquire as to how many examples the algorithm has learned and if that
number is in keeping with what is generally accepted for the task.
2. Were the Training Data Gathered or Generated in Ways that Produced a Biased
Sample?
Not only must the dataset be large, but it also must have some baseline
quality to make useful predictions. The quality of the data, and the extent to
which it may be biased in a particular way, can be probed with various
inquiries. Where did the data come from? Did the researcher him-or-herself
gather the data according to accepted methods? If the researcher instead
received the data from a third party, can he or she vouch for its quality in
any specific way? In the case of open source methods107 or crowdsourced108
data, which are common in the machine learning field, is such verification
even possible?
Courts are already familiar with challenges to data collection methods,
and evaluating whether they produced a biased sample that would reduce
the data’s relevancy to the present issue. In the case of machine learning, the
representativeness of the dataset to the given defendant’s jurisdiction, crime,
or any other feature is crucial for drawing appropriate conclusions from the
machine’s output. This inquiry has obvious implications for a potential
Equal Protection challenge,109 but even assuming there are no cognizable
constitutional issues with the data, the data simply may not be relevant to a
given defendant for any number of reasons.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Loomis110 demonstrates how
these bias and relevancy concerns are already manifesting in algorithmic
output based on data. In challenging the State’s use of Correctional
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (“COMPAS”) to
determine his sentence, Loomis’s expert testified that sentencing courts have
little assurance that the data COMPAS uses are unbiased, or were even
107

108

109

110

“Open source software is software with source code that anyone can inspect, modify, and enhance.”
What Is Open Source?, OPEN SOURCE, https://opensource.com/resources/what-open-source (last
visited Oct. 24, 2018).
“Crowdsourcing is a type of participative online activity in which an individual, organization, or
company with enough means proposes to a group of individuals of varying knowledge,
heterogeneity, and number, via a flexible open call, the voluntary undertaking of a task.” Enrique
Estellés Arolas & Fernando González Ladrón-de-Guevara, Towards an Integrating Crowdsourcing
Definition, 38 J. INFO. SCI. 1, 11 (2011).
The extent to which machine learning evidence might be sufficiently biased in a way that is adverse
to minority groups to mount a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment challenge is outside the scope of
this Comment, but it is a critical question ripe for further research.
881 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Wis. 2016) (noting that the risk-need assessment tool name COMPAS does
not predict the specific likelihood that an individual offender will reoffend).
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relevant to Loomis:
The Court does not know how the COMPAS compares that individual’s
history with the population that it’s comparing them with. The Court
doesn’t even know whether that population is a Wisconsin population, a
New York population, a California population. . . . There’s all kinds of
information that the court doesn’t have, and what we’re doing is we’re misinforming the court when we put these graphs in front of them and let them
use it for sentence.111

Similar questions would be appropriate when probing a machine
learning dataset’s relevancy. If a machine learning algorithm is generating
inculpatory evidence for a Wisconsin defendant, should the data only come
from the Wisconsin population, or the Midwest region, or can nationwide
data suffice? Geography would not be the only consideration, as other
factors could bias the data. The answers to these questions are intensely factspecific and would depend on what the proponent of the machine learning
evidence is trying to prove.
Moreover, even if the prosecution relies on official statistics gathered by
government agencies, these datasets are not inherently high quality. Today,
the accuracy of government databases is often accepted “as an article of faith,
with courts according them a presumption of reliability.”112 While datadriven governance is often a laudable goal, “[t]oday, the prevailing zeitgeist
of governments is one of database expansion, not quality control or
accountability, and a blasé acceptance of data error and its negative
consequences for individuals.”113 Some important figures have taken note.
In Herring v. United States, Justice Ginsburg recognized in her dissent that
“[t]he risk of error stemming from these databases is not slim,” noting issues
with National Crime Information Center, terror watch lists, and public
employment databases.114
Professors Logan and Ferguson note the series of challenges and pitfalls
that accompany government database creation. When data are first
gathered or generated, basic human error in collection or interpretation is
common.115 Sometimes data are collected and uploaded without legal
authorization or counter to what was initially ordered.116 Once errors are

111
112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 756–57 (quoting the testimony of Loomis’s expert).
Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV.
541, 543–44 (2016).
Id. at 543.
555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Logan & Ferguson, supra note 112, at 559 (“At the point of [data] collection, accuracy can be
impaired by basic human error.”).
Id. (noting that states often upload DNA profiles not authorized by the law and DNA information
that should be destroyed is often retained).
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made, they are difficult to discover and difficult to correct.117 If the error is
corrected in one database, it is not guaranteed that the correction will filter
to the myriad of other databases that had, in the past, copied from the initial
database.118 Of course, in a federalist system with hyperlocalist police power,
uniform data collection, management, correction, and dissemination would
be as difficult to implement as it would be helpful.119
3. Was the Data Manipulated? If So, How, and Does that Matter?
When a dataset is not large enough, programmers have several
techniques for manipulating it to artificially create a larger training set. For
example, the algorithm may take many random samples from the original
dataset to create many other, smaller datasets.120 The programmer may also
intentionally distort the examples, such as by warping images or adding
random noise.121 The forms of manipulation are largely influenced by
subjective programmer judgment and norms in the field.
4. How Was the Data Tagged and Labeled?
Moreover, even if a large dataset is collected or generated using standard
techniques, it must be labeled and organized properly, which, for datasets
with millions of examples, is a menial but crucial task. Machine learning
programs only “learn” what they are “taught” from the data, and it is the
programmers who make judgments about what the data show by the way
that they are labeled. Indeed, researchers can intentionally teach the
algorithm nonsense simply by labeling.122 In that way, who labeled the data
and how—and the extent to which the labeling was done properly—are
117

118

119
120
121

122

Id. at 586 (“Ex ante detection of database error, as Professor Kenneth Karst noted fifty years ago,
‘depends on the subject’s access to his own file and his awareness of the need to inspect it. Even
when a record is freely accessible to its subject, there is no assurance that the subject will know of
its existence or its contents.’” (quoting Kenneth L. Karst, “The Files”: Legal Controls over the Accuracy
and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 358 (1966)).
Id. at 588 (“Data is often shared, replicated, backed up and stored in many different databases at
once. Even if a data error is corrected, this does not guarantee that other shared datasets will reflect
the change.”).
Id. at 596–611 (suggesting legislation, regulation, and best practices to coordinate data at the
federal, state, and local levels).
GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 52, at 120 (discussing the most common method, the k-fold crossvalidation procedure).
See Ritchie Ng, Machine Learning Photo OCR, RITCHIENG.COM http://www.ritchieng.com/
machine-learning-photo-ocr/ (last updated Oct. 13, 2018) (noting the possibility of distorting
examples through “warping the image”).
See 3Blue1Brown, Gradient Descent, How Neural Networks Learn | 2, Deep Learning, Chapter 2, YOUTUBE
(OCT. 16, 2017), at 18:10, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHZwWFHWa-w (teaching an
algorithm that an image of Isaac Newton is an image of a cow).
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critical inquiries.
While the researcher may do the labeling herself, it is unlikely that she is
labeling millions of examples by hand. Often researchers use open datasets
already created for public use, but the researcher may have no idea how that
data set was created and labeled.123 Strangers sitting at home may do it for
nominal payment via Amazon Mechanical Turk.124 And, if one machine
learning algorithm can label data,125 other machine learning algorithms can
then use that labeled data to learn other tasks, which can clearly have the
advantage of labeling quickly but would only further compound the potential
risks by adding one machine learning process on top of another.126
C. Problems in the Source Code
An examination of software’s source code may also bring to light details
that affect the admissibility of the evidence under Rule 702. If the
programming itself contains errors, then it is possible that the program’s
conclusions are not the “product of reliable principles and methods.”127
Broadly speaking, “source code” is a combination of words and
mathematical symbols that have a particular meaning in a programming
language.128 Unlike “machine code,” which is a binary collection of 1’s and

123
124
125

126

127
128

Hector Garcia-Molina et al., Challenges in Data Crowdsourcing, 28 IEEE TRANSACTIONS
KNOWLEDGE & DATA ENGINEERING 901, 905–07 (discussing problems with crowdsourced data).
See Ng, supra note 121 (“Hire people on the web to label data (amazon mechanical turk).”).
Tom Simonite, Google’s Brain-Inspired Software Describes What It Sees in Complex Images, MIT TECH.
REV. (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/532666/googles-brain-inspiredsoftware-describes-what-it-sees-in-complex-images/ (“Researchers at Google have created
software that can use complete sentences to accurately describe scenes shown in photos . . . .”).
Linking machine learning applications in this way is increasingly common. One University of
California, Berkeley researcher has developed a dual machine learning system in which one
algorithm identifies the species of bird in a photograph, while a second algorithm analyzes the
decision-making of the first and creates, in sentence format, explanations of how the first algorithm
made its species determination. See For Artificial Intelligence to Thrive, It Must Explain Itself, ECONOMIST
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21737018-if-itcannot-who-will-trust-it-artificial-intelligence-thrive-it-must (discussing the pros and cons of “deep
learning” in artificial intelligence). Google’s AutoML project is actively researching machine
learning algorithms that can themselves write new machine learning algorithms. See Cade Metz,
Building A.I. that Can Build A.I., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/
05/technology/machine-learning-artificial-intelligence-ai.html?_r=0 (discussing Google’s search
for artificial intelligence that can effectively build other A.I.-reliant mechanisms in the absence of
human A.I. experts).
FED. R. EVID. 702(b).
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Computer Source Code: A Source of the Growing Controversy over the Reliability of
Automated Forensic Techniques, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 104 (2016) (“The source code itself is a
combination of words and mathematical symbols that have a particular meaning in the selected
language.”).
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0’s, the source code is human readable,129 and is likely to be intelligible to a
defense expert.130 Source code dictates which tasks a computer program
performs, how the program performs the tasks, and the sequence in which
the program performs the tasks.131 The source code can provide uninhibited
access to the exact ways the programmer decided the machine will operate
and is much more informative than simply observing what goes in and what
comes out.132
Crucially, the source code can reveal simple errors or faulty assumptions
in the program’s creation. In a given program, millions of lines of code—
often pieced together from innumerable sources and developers—give rise to
simple accidents in transcription, mistakes in conditional programming,
software rot,133 or faulty updates to legacy code.134 When one programmer
designs the initial version of a program, it may be difficult for subsequent
programmers in later versions to work around or adapt to the personal style
and conventions of the first.135 Studies demonstrate that, as a result, error
rates of one percent in code are common, which can correspond to tens of
thousands of errors in a single program.136
Moreover, sometimes the software itself contains no errors in the
programming, but, because of human errors in communication or
misunderstanding, the program does not accomplish the task that was
ultimately sought.137 When the device uses several different scientific
disciplines—like, for example, the way a breathalyzer must incorporate
knowledge from programming, chemistry, and biology—differences in

129
130
131
132

133

134
135

136
137

Id. at 105.
Id.
Id. at 103.
Chessman, supra note 19, at 182 (“While some information can be gleaned from viewing the
program in action, this information is highly limited and may omit crucial details that relate to the
reliability and accuracy of the program’s output.”).
Id. at 190 (“‘Software rot’ [happens] where the quality, functionality, and usefulness of a program
actually degrade over time. . . . [It] occurs for a variety of reasons. At the most basic level, each
software update creates new interactions between different portions of the source code, which may
also entail unforeseen interactions and unforeseen consequences.”).
Id. at 186–92.
Id. at 186 n.32 (“Subjective expressiveness is so pronounced that computer code is actually expressively
distinguishable—it is possible ‘to recognize the author of a given program based on programming
style’ in the same way one might identify Nietzsche by his obscurity or Hemingway by his verbosity.”
(quoting Jane Huffman Hayes & Jeff Offutt, Recognizing Authors: An Examination of the Consistent Programmer
Hypothesis, 20 J. SOFTWARE TESTING VERIFICATION & RELIABILITY 329 (2010))).
Id. at 186–87.
Id. at 188. (“Even a programmer who makes no technical coding errors will produce inaccurate
software if the programmer misunderstands the nature or requirements of the job. For example, a
human programmer may misunderstand the program requirements because of miscommunication,
misunderstanding, or accidental omission of important details during instruction.”).
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understanding can give rise to methodological errors that do not come to
light until even after product launch.138 In that case, the programming itself
could be flawless, yet the machine would still be unreliable.
These issues have come to light in only the few cases where state supreme
courts ordered comprehensive inspection into the reliability of certain
devices. In a Minnesota inquiry into the Intoxilyzer 5000EN, a breathalyzer
device, several reliability issues were uncovered with an examination of the
source code. Specifically, it was discovered that the device “has a margin of
error, that radio frequencies from cell phones can disturb the accuracy of the
test, and that the test may erroneously produce a deficient sample.”139
Similarly, in New Jersey, a Special Master was appointed to evaluate the
source code of the State’s widely used breathalyzer device, the Alcotest 7110
MKIII–C.140 While the device was ultimately found to be reliable in most
cases, the Special Master uncovered several problems with how the device
functioned in certain situations, such as when testing the blood alcohol
content of women over sixty141 in addition to other issues, like a need for a
corrective multiplier for some temperature readings.142 Importantly, none of
these errors or considerations would have come to the attention of the court
without examination of the source code.
Even while these issues present themselves in the context of traditional,
non-machine learning software, there is little reason to think that machine
learning program development is immune from human misunderstanding,
slips of the finger in transcription, faulty assumptions, or biases. It is true that
machine learning algorithms work differently than programs of the past, with
bigger sets of data, more processing power, and a different methodology.
However, they are still created according to the ways that all software is
created: as a product of human decision making, with lines of code running
in conjunction with other software, and on hardware that degrades with time.
D. Trade Secret Protections
As a result of the considerations above, lawyers will have a profound
interest in examining the underlying data and source code of machine
learning software for such errors—and yet, standing in their way will be trade
secret protections and reluctance of courts to compel discovery into these
138
139
140
141
142

See id. at 188 n.48 (explaining how programmers of a breathalyzer used an incorrect conversion
factor that was not discovered until examination of the source code).
In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings in Implied Consent Matters, 816 N.W.2d 525, 545 (Minn.
2012).
State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 120 (N.J. 2008).
Id. at 140.
Id. at 145.
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possible defenses. Tech firms are particularly concerned with protecting
trade secrets in machine learning because the field is still in its infancy,
meaning that established players have less advantage over competitive
startups than in other areas they typically dominate, like search in the case
of Google or social media in the case of Facebook.143 Today, in non-machine
learning software, parties cannot observe the critical details of how the
program was constructed because of its proprietary nature, and the
programming firms themselves are often reluctant to reveal the source code
or data that form the basis of their business success.144
A trade secret is nonpublic information that is the subject of reasonable
efforts to maintain its secrecy and that confers a business advantage over
competitors who lack that information.145 Both data and source code have
consistently been held to be trade secrets, and thus courts have often been
reluctant to compel discovery into either, even for defendants in criminal
actions who could use the information to mount a meaningful defense.
Defendants and third-party developers are increasingly disputing the
discoverability and trade secret protections with respect to discovery of nonmachine learning software, yet rarely is the source code turned over for
inspection.146 For instance, the two technologies that have so far experienced
the most litigation over discovery of source code are infrared breath testing
devices (i.e., breathalyzers) and DNA probabilistic genotyping, mostly
surrounding the popular software TrueAllele.147 In the breathalyzer cases,
“the clear majority of courts rejected defendants’ requests that a defense
expert be granted access to the program’s source code.”148 Likewise, in the
TrueAllele cases, “although the issue has been litigated in at least seven states,
no state court has ordered discovery of the TrueAllele source code” due to
trade secret protections.149
143
144

145
146
147
148

149

See Battle of the Brains, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 2017, at 61, 62 (discussing how tech giants are investing
large sums to develop their AI capabilities).
Chartes Tait Graves & Brian D. Range, Identification of Trade Secrets Claims in Litigation: Solutions for a
Ubiquitous Dispute, 5 NW. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 68, 85–86 (2006) (describing the typicality of
plaintiff corporations resisting to specifically disclose trade secret details in litigation, including
research and development details and business strategies).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (2012) (defining “trade secret”); Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc.,
790 F.2d 1195, 1199–1203 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining the requirements of a protected trade secret).
Imwinkelried, supra note 128, at 100.
Id.
Id. (citing State v. Underdahl, 749 N.W.2d 117, 120–21 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 767 N.W.2d 677 (Minn. 2009) (affirming the district court’s denial of production of computer
code); People v. Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681–82 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2007); State v. Burnell, No.
MV06479034S, 2007 WL 241230, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2007); State v. Walters, No.
DBDMV050340997S, 2006 WL 785393, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2006); Moe v. State, 944
So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
Imwinkelried, supra note 128 at 111.
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Undoubtedly, the state has a legitimate interest in protecting trade secrets
not only for developers’ economic protection, but also to ensure society reaps
the benefit of continued innovation. Trade secrets are protected in federal
and state statutes, as well as incorporated into Rule 501’s evolving common
law of privileges.150 And yet, under statute and at common law, it is wellsettled that the trade secret privilege is a conditional or qualified one.151 The
trade secrets protections of every state include some form of an “injustice
exception” that allows for discovery. “While the precise wording varies from
state to state, the injustice exceptions substantially suggest that trade secret
privilege from discovery exists only ‘if the allowance of the privilege will not
tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.’”152
Thus, courts have a number of tools at their disposal to not only allow
source code discovery in the first place (permission by statute or Rule 501),
but also to protect the legitimate economic interests of developers. Once
discovery is compelled, courts have several safeguards to protect developers’
business interest: courts can conduct in camera review, issue protective
orders, seal records, threaten sanctions for improper disclosure, or require
the parties to mutually agree on a third-party to review the source code.153
Unfortunately, courts rarely use these tools and instead typically deny
discovery altogether.154
The California Court of Appeals, reasoning in People v. Superior Court
(Chubbs), typifies how courts often hold that discovery of the source code itself
requires meeting a high burden that the source code will assist the defense
where no other unprotected information will. In that case, Martell Chubbs
was charged with murder on the basis of a DNA result that would on average
match randomly 1 in 10,000 times.155 At trial, however, the prosecution put
forward a different analysis that put the match as randomly occurring on

150

151
152
153

154
155

Id. at 125 (“Although Congress balked at enacting the draft rule, many states have done so;
regardless, the federal courts have recognized the privilege by common-law process under Federal
Rule 501.”).
Id. at 126.
Chessman, supra note 19, at 212 (quoting JEROME G. SNIDER ET AL., CORPORATE PRIVILEGES
AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION § 8.02[1] (2011)).
See id. at 213. Many other forms of protection are also possible. In civil cases, courts have issue the
following protective orders, inter alia: The opposing party’s experts could examine the trade secret
information only in a secure room; to gain access to the secure room, the experts had to identify
themselves by iris and palm-print scans; during their examination of the information, the experts
had to use paper bearing tags emitting radio waves to determine how many pages of notes the
experts had used; counsel and the experts had to sign declarations that they would access the data
only for use in the present litigation; and the trial courtroom would be closed to the public during
any testimony discussing the trade secret information. Id.
Imwinkelried, supra note 128, at 126–27.
People v. Superior Court, No. B258569, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2015).
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average 1 in 1.62 quintillion times.156 Chubbs sought the source code of the
subsequent program to account for the discrepancy and examine the
assumptions built into the software.
The Court of Appeals held that source code is a trade secret and that it
could be discoverable only by making “a prima facie, particularized
showing” that the source code would be relevant and necessary to a
defense.157 The court concluded that Chubbs had not met that burden. The
court reasoned that Chubbs had already received extensive information
regarding the program’s methodology and underlying assumptions from
materials other than the source code.158 Unfortunately, the appellate court
did not explain how Chubbs could make the particularized showing it
demanded or what would constitute sufficient particularity to overcome the
trade secret protection.159
V. ADMISSIBILITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
Several constitutional provisions may be implicated by machine learning
identification in criminal prosecutions. Defendants may cite the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause160 or the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause.161 Some will likely provide little protection to
156
157
158

159

160

161

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 21. This argument, that the defendant’s access to other records, checklists for operation, and
use manuals is sufficient to challenge the evidentiary weight of the device, is a common refrain in
the courts. However, Professor Imwinkelreid argues these types of records are not nearly as
informative as the source code. Commenting on similar reasoning of the Court in People v.
Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008), Professor Imwinkelreid argues:
Those records do not contain the same information that an examination of the software’s
source code would yield. The analyst’s checklist might minimize the risk of human error
in conducting a test at a specific time and place, but the checklist provides no insight into
any inherent defects in the program logic. Likewise, maintenance records could prove that
for a certain period after a maintenance the device was operating as intended; but again,
even if the device was operating as intended, there might be a defect buried in the source
code. In sum, the discoverability of those documents does not undercut the case for
discovery of the source code.
Imwinkelried, supra note 128, at 120.
Chessman, supra note 19, at 199 (“The appellate court did not explain how Mr. Chubbs could make
the particularized showing it demanded without access to the source code, nor did it identify what
showings would constitute sufficient particularity.”).
The Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, and the Supreme Court’s relevant
jurisprudence, almost surely would allow prosecutors to require suspects to have recordings of their
voice, images of their face, or other identifiers to be collected and fed into a machine learning
algorithm, and hence this issue is not extensively discussed in this Comment. In short, because
Schmerber v. California holds that only “testimony” may not be compelled under the Fifth
Amendment, the state may compel physical evidence and identifiers that could be fed into the
algorithm. 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
There is much to explore with machine learning in the Fourth Amendment context that is mostly
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defendants who wish to exclude inculpatory machine learning evidence, such
as the Fifth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment, meanwhile, will almost
surely require the evidence to admitted in the form of expert testimony but
will not bar it entirely.
A. Due Process Under the Fifth Amendment
Machine learning output is often inexplicable, and experts sometimes
cannot explain how the machine came to a particular conclusion.162 On this
basis, defendants may argue that such “guilt by black box” violates the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause163 because, arguendo, “it offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental.”164 This “fundamental principle” may be
that the inculpatory evidence must have some kind of discernible logic,
explanation, ability to be examined or challenged. However, defendants
making this argument will have little chance of success, at least as freestanding due process precedent currently exists.
Two background norms govern the Supreme Court’s consideration of
free-standing due process. First, where all the specific guarantees of the Bill
of Rights have been observed and a guilty verdict has been reached, the
Court typically finds that the defendant has thus enjoyed “all the process that
is due.”165 “Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual

162
163
164
165

outside the scope of this Comment. See generally Melanie Reid, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment in the
Age of Supercomputers, Artificial Intelligence, and Robots, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 863 (2017) (offering a new
perspective on Fourth Amendment protections in the age of machine learning). However, there
may be conceivable instances where a defendant would try to cite the Fourth Amendment as a bar
to inculpatory evidence derived from machine learning processes. For example, to echo the facts
of Maryland v. King, an individual may be arrested for one crime and have his photo taken, voice
recorded, or cheek swabbed to gather data that would be fed into a machine learning algorithm,
which could then identify and tie the arrestee to past unsolved crimes. 569 U.S. 435, 441 (2013).
The Supreme Court held in King that a very similar situation was undoubtedly a search, and indeed
one performed without individualized suspicion. Id. at 446, 448. But the Court ultimately held
that it did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the state’s interest in identifying perpetrators
of past crimes outweighed the relatively non-invasive nature of a cheek swab for an arrestee. Id. at
453. Indeed, the mere photographic identification that would likely be employed in at least some
machine learning analysis is undoubtedly even less invasive than that. “[W]e have never held that
merely taking a person’s photograph invades any recognized ‘expectation of privacy.’” Id. at 477
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). Thus, defendants would
likely find little help in the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to exclude machine learning
evidence procured and used in this way.
For a more detailed look at explainability problems in machine learning, see infra Section VI.C.
“No person shall be . . .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992).
Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1, 23 (2005)
(“Although the Due Process Clause provides a general baseline of fundamental fairness in the
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source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government
behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive
due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’”166 Second,
beyond enumerated protections in the Bill of Rights, whatever remaining
protections are afforded by the free-standing Due Process Clause are “to be
construed narrowly,” and the Court has consistently declined to expand its
scope, especially when doing so would interfere with the law enforcement
powers of the states.167
No specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights regulates the admissibility of
evidence, but the Due Process Clause does in very limited circumstances.168
The Court currently recognizes only two forms of “bad evidence” that
“invalidate the defendant’s conviction on due process grounds.”169 One is
“government-induced perjury”170 and the other is “identification testimony
from a suggestive lineup.”171 “Admission of such evidence, in the Court’s
view, is fundamentally unfair and violates due process.”172 This analysis,
however, only demonstrates that free standing due process is the proper
inquiry to evaluate evidence; once the Court is operating within that
doctrine, defense counsel would face severe headwinds in trying to establish
a free standing due process right to exclude machine learning evidence.
To do so, the defendant would have to show that machine learning
evidence “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”173 The inquiry of

166
167

168

169
170
171
172
173

criminal process, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where a more specific provision of
the Bill of Rights applies, that provision constitutes all the process that is due.”); see also Jerold H.
Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines,
45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 399 (2001) (“The range of regulation imposed under free-standing due
process could also be restricted by giving a preemptive impact to the incorporated specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.”).
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Israel, supra note 165, at 387 (“The Court’s decisions in the post-incorporation era have, indeed,
considered several major reformulations of due process doctrine as applied to criminal procedure,
with some accepted and some rejected. The most important of these involved: (1) characterizing
free-standing due process as a disfavored concept to be construed narrowly . . . .”). But see id. at
389–97 (questioning how truly “limited” free standing due process is by listing the “extraordinary
range” of approximately fifty-one different due process protections the Court has found throughout
the typical criminal adjudication timeline).
Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 86 (2008) (“The Due Process Clause
of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments provides the framework for testing evidence rules for
constitutionality.”).
Id. at 88 (“Today’s constitutional doctrine holds that bad evidence may invalidate the defendant’s
conviction on due process grounds.”).
Id. at 89 (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 110, 112–13 (1935)).
Id. (citing Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 441, 442–43 (1969)).
Id.
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992).
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what is “ranked as fundamental” is hardly scientific. Courts must “test the
fundamental nature of a right within the context of that common law system of
justice, rather than against some hypothesized ‘civilized system’ or some
foreign system growing out of different traditions.”174 Thus, a right is
fundamental if it “is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered
liberty.”175
A defendant’s most apparent argument would be, first, as a threshold
matter, that the common law tradition has always required evidence that is
explainable, bears discernible logic, and may be examined or challenged;
and second, that machine learning evidence does not fit that mold because
oftentimes experts cannot discern how the machine made a particular
determination.
Unfortunately, a defendant would have difficulty
demonstrating a long-established recognition at common law that evidence
must be fully explainable. Then, even if the Court recognized such a view, it
is not clear machine learning evidence would meet that definition, as its
processes, methodology, data, and assumptions can, if not fully, be mostly
explained and understood. Machine learning does have logical, scientific,
and mathematical principles; and while it does make errors, such rates of
error are knowable.176 Moreover, machine learning output would likely be
introduced in the form of expert testimony,177 meaning the defendant would
have the opportunity to cross-examine an expert on the machine’s
capabilities and processes.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Loomis examined an issue that bears
some resemblance to the above due process inquiry, though different from
the issue of substantive evidence at trial. After pleading guilty to several
offenses related to a drive-by shooting, Loomis appeared for his sentencing
hearing,178 and in determining his sentence, the court relied on a report
generated by COMPAS, one of the most popular risk assessment tools in the
United States.179
Loomis challenged his sentencing determination in part on due process
grounds, arguing that he and the sentencing judge knew little about how the
algorithm worked or the extent to which it relied on his gender in making a
risk estimation.180 In essence, he argued, it was black-box sentencing, thus
174
175
176
177
178
179

180

Israel, supra note 165, at 384 (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968)).
For discussions of machine learning and error rates, see supra Parts III and & IV.
See supra Part IV.
State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Wis. 2016).
Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/
article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing (“Northpointe’s software is among
the most widely used assessment tools in the country.”).
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 765 (“Loomis asserts that because COMPAS risk scores take gender into
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offending his due process right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate
information.181 The court conceded that, due to trade secret protections,
neither it nor the parties understood fully how the algorithm worked or the
extent to which gender was a factor.182 Yet the court ultimately decided that
because Loomis could challenge the inputs and outputs of the algorithm—
that is, the data that went in and the conclusions drawn from it—he had
sufficient basis to challenge the algorithm even without knowing the extent
of its internal processes,183 and thus he enjoyed due process. As for the use
of gender, the court concluded that the use of gender worked to promote the
accuracy of the algorithm’s conclusions, which satisfied due process.184
Again, Loomis is instructive insofar as the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
evaluating due process rights in the context of unknown algorithmic
processes, but it was not a case of machine learning or evidence at trial. Even
so, Loomis shows courts’ reluctance to find new due process rights in black
box, algorithmic evidence. When machine learning evidence is used at trial
to help prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, courts may echo the Loomis
decision and similarly find due process satisfied when (1) the defendant can
at least challenge the data that go into the algorithm (a requirement that can
be addressed with procedural rules and discovery wholly within the Court’s
control) and (2) the algorithm possesses some sufficient level of accuracy,
which can come to light at a Daubert hearing on admissibility on crossexamination at trial.

181

182

183
184

account, a circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment violates a defendant’s due
process right not to be sentenced on the basis of gender.”).
Id. at 760 (“It is well-established that a defendant has a constitutionally protected due process right
to be sentenced upon accurate information.” (internal citations omitted)). See also id. (“The plurality
opinion [in Gardner] concluded that the defendant ‘was denied due process of law when the death
sentence was imposed, at least in part, on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to
deny or explain.’” (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 351 (1977))).
Id. at 761 (“Northpointe, Inc., the developer of COMPAS, considers COMPAS a proprietary
instrument and a trade secret. Accordingly, it does not disclose how the risk scores are determined
or how the factors are weighed.”).
Id. at 761–62 (“Loomis had an opportunity to challenge his risk scores by arguing that other factors
or information demonstrate their inaccuracy.”).
Id. at 766 (“Likewise, there is a factual basis underlying COMPAS’s use of gender in calculating
risk scores. Instead, it appears that any risk assessment tool which fails to differentiate between men
and woman will misclassify both genders.”).

Feb. 2019]

MACHINE LEARNING EVIDENCE: ADMISSIBILITY AND WEIGHT

949

B. Confrontation Under the Sixth Amendment
When the prosecution seeks to admit machine learning evidence, it is
likely that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause would require an
expert to testify in-person and be subject to cross examination.185
Analogously, when other forms of machine evidence have been used in
prosecution, the Supreme Court has held that, under the Sixth Amendment,
the results may not be admitted without an expert subject to cross
examination.
Indeed, the manner in which the Sixth Amendment requires expert
witnesses to testify on drug analysis evidence may provide a framework for how
machine learning experts would be required to testify in prosecutions.186
Similar to how lab scientists are required to testify in-person and be subject to
cross examination, it is likely that a machine learning expert would also have to
appear in person to admit inculpatory machine learning output into evidence.
VI. THE WEIGHT OF UNEXPLAINABLE MACHINE LEARNING EVIDENCE
Parts IV and V establish that there is nothing inherently inadmissible
about machine learning evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Fifth Amendment, or the Sixth Amendment. Yet, assuming the machine
learning evidence is admissible, “there can be significant remaining questions
about the weight and believability of the evidence.”187 Indeed, when judges
rule on the admissibility of scientific evidence, they are expressly playing the
role of gatekeeper and rejecting only evidence that is not the product of
reliable principles and methods.188 Rejecting scientific evidence seems to be
exception rather than the norm, in keeping with the Supreme Court’s
observation that the Federal Rules of Evidence are construed to be liberal
and permissive.189 In fact, Professors Helland and Klick conclude “there is
virtually no systematic evidence supporting the view that adoption of Daubert
185
186

187
188
189

U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”).
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 316–18 (2009) (reasoning that any perceived
objectivity in scientific evidence does not render it immune from the Confrontation Clause); see also
Erick J. Poorbaugh, Note, Interfacing Your Accuser: Computerized Evidence and the Confrontation Clause
Following Melendez-Diaz, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 213, 229 (2010) (“Although the Supreme Court
in Melendez-Diaz stated that the ‘witnesses’ in that case were ‘the analysts,’ it did not specify which
of the analysts must testify (or whether they all must testify).”).
Imwinkelried, supra note 128 at 118.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (referring to a “gatekeeping
role for the judge”).
See Imwinkelried, supra note 128, at 118 (“[T]he Court . . . characterized the general spirit of the
Federal Rules as ‘liberal’ and ‘permissive.’).
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makes any difference at all” in keeping “junk science” out of the
courtroom.190 Thus, for the oft-admitted “shaky but admissible evidence,”
as Justice Blackmun put it in Daubert, “[v]igorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof” are the principal tools for swaying the trier of fact.191
For three reasons, these burdens for the counsel who aims to discount the
persuasiveness of the “shaky but admissible evidence” are likely greater in
the criminal context than in the civil liability context that Justice Blackmun
was presiding over in Daubert. First, as practitioners have observed, “the
appellate courts appear to be more willing to second-guess trial court
judgments on the admissibility of purported scientific evidence in civil cases
than in criminal cases.”192 That is, courts seem to be less demanding or
rigorous of scientific evidence in criminal cases, which, to the dissatisfaction
of many, has often included “shaky” evidence like handwriting analysis, hair
comparisons, fingerprint examinations, firearms identifications, bitemark
analysis, and intoxication testing.193 Most challenges to admissibility of these
types of evidence have been unsuccessful, even while exposing “the lack of
empirical support for many commonly employed forensic techniques.”194
Second, machines are often afforded a presumption of reliability that can
make them unduly persuasive to a lay person.195 And third, once a trial court
rules that evidence is admissible, the appellate courts are highly deferential
to that decision, and only review under an abuse of discretion standard.
Given that state of affairs, losing the admissibility battle puts considerable
onus on trial counsel to persuade the trier of fact to discount the weight that
the evidence should be assigned. Jurors might be cautious to assign much
weight to machine learning evidence because of its peculiar property that it
is often not explainable.
That is, even if one has cleared the above trade secret hurdles, probed
the data, and examined the source code, often no one can explain how or
why a machine learning algorithm reached a particular result, which may (or
may not) significantly reduce the weight it is assigned by the trier of fact.
Regardless of machine learning’s potential use in litigation specifically, this
issue is severe because machine learning could be useful in many areas that
190
191
192
193
194
195

Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, Does Anyone Get Stopped at the Gate? An Empirical Assessment of the
Daubert Trilogy in the States, 20 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 32 (2012).
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD 11 (2009).
Id. at 94, 104, 107–08, 117–18.
1 COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 614 (6th ed. 2016).
Kroll et al., supra note 4, at 680 (“[D]ecisions made by computers may enjoy an undeserved
assumption of fairness or objectivity.”).
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require ex post rationale and explanation.196 Given the present state of the
technology, it is foreseeable that when machine learning begins to produce
substantive evidence in litigation, an expert witness on the stand—perhaps
even the individual who created the machine learning algorithm at issue—
would not be explain how exactly it yielded the inculpatory results. This
unexplainability may even be machine learning’s most concerning feature to
jurors and lead them to discount the weight it should be afforded.
A. Examples of Inexplicable Machine Learning
To illustrate how this problem manifests, consider the earlier example of
a programmer who is training a machine learning algorithm to recognize her
mother’s face in photographs.197 As explained, the algorithm could be
identifying the mother by means that humans do, such as recognizing the
collection of features in the height and width of the face, shape of the head
and hair, and so on.198 But sometimes the machine might establish
correlations and rules that are not apparent at first glance or that humans
would not use. For instance, if the machine has only ever learned from
images in which the mother was photographed with flash on, the machine
may use the brightness of the image as a basis to identify the mother, and
with more weight than any attribute about her face.199 If this were the case,
when the machine later must confront an image of the mother in which she
was not photographed with flash, the machine might not be able to identify
her (a false negative), even though humans would not be confused by such a
situation. Conversely, the machine might mistakenly identify as the mother
an entirely different woman who was photographed with flash (a false
196

197

198

199

These areas include, but are not limited to, national security. See Cliff Kuang, Can A.I. Be Taught to
Explain Itself?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/magazine/
can-ai-be-taught-to-explain-itself.html (quoting a national security analyst’s legal need for
explainable AI decisions, “If I’m going to sign off on a decision, I need to be able to justify it.”).
For an initial discussion of this example, see supra Section II.B. This particular example is
hypothetical and is only offered to illustrate the general issue that machines can, and do, learn
unforeseen rules. It is not from a specific study.
See Murphy, supra note 56 (“The software extracts information from thousands of facial data points,
including nose width, mustache shape, eyebrows, corners of the mouth, hairline and even aspects
of the face we don’t have words for. It then turns the faces into numbers.”).
Machine learning researchers are well aware of this issue and have confronted it in a variety of
contexts:
Tomaso Poggio, the director of M.I.T.’s Center for Brains, Minds and Machines, offered
a classic parable used to illustrate this disconnect. The Army trained a program to
differentiate American tanks from Russian tanks with 100 percent accuracy. Only later
did analysts realize that the American tanks had been photographed on a sunny day and
the Russian tanks had been photographed on a cloudy day. The computer had learned to
detect brightness.
Id.
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positive). In such a scenario, the machine learned a correlation that was
undoubtedly accurate within the universe of data it was initially shown, but
not one that would be reliable for all varying situations. This is a common
problem with the rules that machines learn.200
Whether the machine is deducing obvious rules (like facial attributes) or
non-obvious and potentially unreliable rules (like brightness in an image) is
impossible to predict ex ante and discovering what rules the machine has
deduced sometimes requires considerable extra research for the
programmer. Indeed, what rules and correlations the machine deduces may
forever remain a mystery.
This principle was at work in a recent Stanford University study that
aimed to build a machine learning algorithm that could analyze a person’s
face and determine that person’s sexual orientation.201 Specifically,
researchers compiled images of 75,000 users’ faces from various dating sites
and used the profiles’ self-reported gay or straight identification to train the
algorithm.202 From this pool of data, the algorithm focused on 35,000 images
of 15,000 users to learn a set of correlations between the content of the
images and the labels “gay” and “straight.” Later, in a test set of different
images that the machine had never seen before, the algorithm would make
its best guess.203 The program was remarkably accurate at determining
straight versus gay men, at eighty-one percent accuracy, and slightly less
accurate at sorting gay versus straight women, at seventy-one percent.204
Meanwhile, the machine was far more accurate than humans, who only
correctly determined male sexual orientation sixty-one percent of the time
and that of women fifty-four percent of the time.205

200

201
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204
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See Hubert L. Dreyfus & Stuart E. Dreyfus, What Artificial Experts Can and Cannot Do, 6 AI & SOC’Y
18, 21 (1992) (further explaining the same American-Russian tank example). The issue can even
lead to needless deaths in emergency situations:
[One algorithm created to better triage emergency room patients] seemed to show that
asthmatics with pneumonia fared better than the typical patient. This correlation was real,
but the data masked its true cause. Asthmatic patients who contract pneumonia are
immediately flagged [by doctors] as dangerous cases; if they tended to fare better, it was
because they got the best care the hospital could offer. A dumb algorithm, looking at this
data, would have simply assumed asthma meant a patient was likely to get better—and
thus concluded that they were in less need of urgent care. . . . The story of asthmatics with
pneumonia eventually became a legendary allegory in the machine-learning community.
Kuang, supra note 196.
See Murphy, supra note 56.
Yilun Wang & Michael Kosinski, Deep Neural Networks Are More Accurate than Humans at Detecting Sexual
Orientation from Facial Images, 114 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 246, 248 (2018).
Id. at 249.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 253.
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As to how the algorithm was making its relatively accurate determinations,
the researchers could only speculate. One of their hypotheses was that the
levels of different hormones in gay versus straight users (the prenatal
hormone theory of sexual orientation206) might have manifested some minute
differences in their respective facial structures, differences unseen by the
human eye but detectable by the algorithm.207 One researcher explained,
“[h]umans might have trouble detecting these tiny footprints that border on
the infinitesimal” but “[c]omputers can do that very easily.”208 With respect
to men, presence of facial hair or baseball caps also probably played a role
for some images.209 In other similar tests, researchers found that the images
of gay men usually were better quality and had better lighting, and the
algorithm may have used that as the basis to conclude the sexual
orientation.210 Yet, the author of the Stanford study concedes that he could
not say with certainty how the algorithm made its determinations.211
B. Why Machine Learning Is Unexplainable
Machine learning is often unexplainable because of the sheer number of
data points involved and “avalanche of statistical probability” involved.212
Many techniques are at play or constantly being developed, and choosing
among them can be the whim or preference of the programmer. “The sheer
proliferation of different techniques, none of them obviously better than the
others, can leave researchers flummoxed over which one to choose. Many
of the most powerful are bafflingly opaque; others evade understanding
because they involve an avalanche of statistical probability.”213
Responding to that deficiency is an entirely new subfield of machine
learning research, dubbed “xAI,” for “explainable AI.”214 The Defense
206
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209
210
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The prenatal hormone theory is commonly circulated but controversial in both the scientific and
LGBT advocacy communities. See Louis Hoffman & Justin Lincoln, Science, Interpretation, and Identity
in the Sexual Orientation Debate: What Does Finger Length Have to Do With Understanding a Person?, 56
PSYCCRITIQUES,
Apr.
13,
2011,
http://psqtest.typepad.com/blogPostPDFs/
201103880_psq_56-15_scienceInterpretationAndIdentifyInTheSexualOrientationDebate.pdf
(reviewing SIMON LEVAY, GAY, STRAIGHT, AND THE REASON WHY: THE SCIENCE OF SEXUAL
ORIENTATION (2011) and commenting on the controversy surrounding the introduction of science
into politically charged areas such as sexual identity).
Wang & Kosinski, supra note 202, at 246.
Kuang, supra note 196.
See Murphy, supra note 56 (showing that the algorithm looked at factors like grooming habits).
Id.
Kuang, supra note 196.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Mark G. Core et. al., Building Explainable Artificial Intelligence Systems, 21 PROC. NAT’L CONF.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1766, 1766 (2006) (setting forth a modular and generic architecture for
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Department’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) is
currently conducting research into how AI technologies can explain their
decision-making processes, though the field is still in its infancy.215 Thus, for
the foreseeable future, any machine learning output that is admitted into
evidence bears a substantial likelihood that it will be unexplainable.
C. Comparing Machine Learning to Current Unexplainable Evidence
Few analogs exist to this problem in other forms of evidence used at trial.
When scholars write about “black boxes” and evidence, they typically mean
to highlight the fact that lay jurors do not fully understand how the device
works—the implicit assumption is that experts do. But as machine learning
exists now, that assumption is faulty, since experts often cannot fully account
for machine learning determinations, in spite of the machine’s demonstrable
accuracy for certain tasks.
Professor Rich analogizes algorithms to another black box with which
courts are very familiar in the Fourth Amendment sphere: drug dogs. With
drug sniffing dogs just as in algorithms, “we know the inputs, and we receive
the outputs, but we cannot fully understand how the internal mechanism
works.”216 Professor Rich argues that treating algorithms in the way that we
do dogs will allow “courts and police to ignore what they are ill-equipped to
evaluate,” namely, how an algorithm works, and focus only on the accuracy
of its outcomes.217 Professor Rich’s analogy is limited, however, to how
algorithms may be used to develop reasonable suspicion or probable cause,
and does not speak to admissibility or weight.
A closer analogy might be “super recognizers,”218 or humans with the
uncanny ability to recognize even the most blurry or corrupted images of a
face to aid in investigations.219 The super recognizer essentially exploits two

215
216
217
218
219

explaining the behavior of simulated entities); David Gunning, Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI),
DARPA/I20, https://www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-artificial-intelligence (last visited Jan.
5, 2018) (arguing that explainable AI is necessary if users are to understand, trust, and effectively
manage new AI).
Gunning, supra note 214.
Rich, supra note 11, at 912.
Id. at 919.
See Richard Russell et al., Super-recognizers: People with Extraordinary Face Recognition Ability, 16
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 252, 252 (2009) (defining the term super-recognizers).
Anna K. Bobak & Sarah Bate, Superior Face Recognition: A Very Special Super Power, SCI. AM.. (Feb. 2,
2016),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/superior-face-recognition-a-very-specialsuper-power/ (“London’s Metropolitan Police have created a super-recogniser unit that is used to
spot criminals in a crowd or within CCTV footage. . . . It’s easy to spot other potential roles for
super-recognisers—issues of national security are currently paramount, and they may spot wanted
or missing people more readily than typical officers.”).
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capabilities in tandem. First is the ability to remember a face after de minimis
exposure, and second is the ability to recognize it in subsequent situations.
How exactly a super recognizer memorizes the face with such precision is a
mystery. One hypothesis was that super recognizers holistically evaluate a
face differently than the average layperson, though that possibility was
debunked in subsequent research.220 Another hypothesis was that super
recognizers spend longer than average looking at the eyes,221 though
subsequent research showed they actually spend more time focusing on the
nose and center of the face.222 In any case, the super recognizers cannot
themselves articulate how their ability works, nor can other researchers
provide a comprehensive explanation. The super recognizers are a human
black box.
If a super recognizer were to testify at trial on the basis of her abilities and
give inculpatory evidence, it would perhaps give some kind of analog to how
a testifying expert cannot account for how a machine learning algorithm
made the same kind of facial recognition determination. At present,
however, there is no documented use of a super recognizer testifying at trial,
and thus no instance of how a judge rationalized the admissibility of one’s
testimony, to say nothing of how jurors assigned it weight and credibility.223
D. Jurors’ Trust in Unexplainable Machine Learning Evidence
It is an entirely open question the extent to which, in open court, jurors
would trust the validity of unexplainable machine learning evidence. Indeed,
this question is ripe for empirical research by psychologists and legal scholars
of scientific evidence.
Developers understand that the extent to which a person trusts a machine
in everyday life is highly variable and context-dependent. Outside the
courtroom, an individual’s trust in a machine ranges from none or little (for
a variety of reasons, one of which is often because it is a machine224), to passive
220
221

222

223

224

Id. (“[O]nly modest links have been reported between face recognition ability and holistic
processing skills, suggesting other factors may be at play.”).
Id. (“Eye-tracking technology has frequently been used by psychologists to identify the regions of
the face that are particularly informative in face recognition. Typical people tend to focus on
the eyes, suggesting they carry important information about facial identity.”).
Id. (“[S]uper-recognisers spent more time viewing the nose. These findings challenge existing
conclusions, suggesting that it is the centre[sic] of the face, rather than the eye region, that is optimal
for facial identity recognition.”).
Gary Edmond & Natalie Wortley, Interpreting Image Evidence: Facial Mapping, Police Familiars and SuperRecognisers in England and Australia, 3 J. INT’L & COMP. L. 473, 492 (2016) (“So far there are no
reported cases involving police super-recognisers as witnesses.”).
Berkeley J. Dietvorst et al, Algorithm Aversion: People Erroneously Avoid Algorithms After Seeing Them Err,
144 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1, 10 (2014) (“The results of five studies show that seeing
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trust in machines without so much as a second thought225 (when the machine
is functioning, that is226), and even up to great affirmative trust in a machine
because it is a machine.227 Researchers find trust in machines to be highly
variable and influenced by different factors like belief about the functionality
of the technology, belief that the technology is helpful, and belief that the
technology is reliable.228 Often, trust is dependent on mere different
presentations of a technology—such as the inclusion of anthropomorphic
qualities, for example229—and not by the capabilities of the machine itself.
To be sure, trust itself means different things in different contexts, and
the meanings may not necessarily translate from one situation to another.
For example, consider voir dire, where a prosecutor hoping to use machine
learning output at trial may question potential jurors about their trust in
technology in specific situations. It would be risky for the prosecution to
assume, say, that a juror’s self-reported “trust in technology” would
necessarily indicate trust in black-box machine output to prove a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Inside the courtroom, how jurors will
respond to machine learning output is very difficult to predict. As Professor
Roth summarizes, “juries might irrationally defer to the apparent objectivity

225

226

227

228

229

algorithms err makes people less confident in them and less likely to choose them over an inferior
human forecaster.”).
See Paul Robinette et al., Overtrust of Robots in Emergency Evacuation Scenarios, 11 ACM/IEEE INT’L
CONF. HUMAN ROBOT INTERACTION 101, 104 (2016) (finding that in a simulated emergency
situation 100% of human test subjects followed a guide robot to safety through the hallways of a
building even when the robot led in directions opposite posted exit signs); see also id. (“Eighty-five
percent of participants indicated that they would follow the robot in a future emergency.”).
See Davide Salanitri et al., Relationship Between Trust and Usability in Virtual Environments: An Ongoing
Study, in HUMAN COMPUTER INTERACTION: DESIGN AND EVALUATION 49, 50 (Masaaki Kurosu
ed. 2015) (“A low level of usability could compromise the users’ interaction with a product, thus
affecting the individual’s trust in the technology . . . .”).
See Jennifer Saranow, Steered Wrong: Drivers Trust GPS Even to a Fault, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 18,
2008, 11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120578983252543135 (“If your GPS device
told you to drive off a clib would you do it? Norman Sussman nearly did.”); see also The Office US,
Michael Drives into a Lake—The Office US, YOUTUBE (Aug. 8, 2017) https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=DOW_kPzY_JY (satirizing the enormous trust that drivers have in turn-by-turn GPS
navigation by depicting a driver intentionally driving into a lake because “maybe it’s a shortcut”
and “the machine knows”).
Salanitri, supra note 226, at 50 (“[T]rust in a technology reflects at least three main beliefs about
the attributes of a technology: (i) belief about the functionality of the product, which refers to the
capability of a technology to perform specific tasks; (ii) belief that the technology is helpful . . . (iii)
Belief that the technology is reliable, hence, the perception that a technology works properly.”).
For instance, even though the two technologies provide the same service, first-time passengers
report more trust in Tesla’s self-driving technology than Google’s, owing in part Tesla’s
incorporation of human-like qualities a voice and a name. Google’s, meanwhile, has no
anthropomorphic qualities. See Walter Frick, Tesla, Autopilot, and the Challenge of Trusting Machines,
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 11, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/07/tesla-autopilot-and-the-challenge-oftrusting-machines.
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of machines, or reject machine sources because of an irrational mistrust of
machines’ apparent complexities, even when the sources are highly
credible.”230
Additionally, inextricably linked to the credibility of the machine is the
credibility the jurors extend to the testifying expert him- or herself. That
human credibility would likely affect credibility that jurors would extend to
the underlying machine, especially as the scientific evidence at issue is
particularly complex for laypeople.231 In that case, the prosecution or
defense would surely already be familiar with the usual tactics to use to attack
the expert’s credibility. These tactics include choosing and preparing an
expert who (1) appears to lack bias, (2) bears impressive credentials, (3)
displays “a pleasant personality,” (4) can present “a clear, objective, focused,
not overly long presentation that utilizes diagrams and models,” (5) uses lay
terms, (6) demonstrates knowledge in the area of expertise, (7) gives testimony
that is “complete, consistent, and not too complex,” and (8) shows familiarity
with the instant case.232 As for attacking credibility, studies seem to show
the classic methods are effective. Jurors report less credibility for experts that
seem like “hired guns,” as in experts that are highly paid and bear sterling
credentials.233 Jurors also distrust witnesses that offer inconsistent statements
between depositions and trial testimony.234
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Roth, Testimony, supra note 17, at 2038 (2017); see also Hon. Donald E. Shelton et. al., An IndirectEffects Model of Mediated Adjudication: The CSI Myth, the Tech Effect, and Metropolitan Jurors’ Expectations
for Scientific Evidence, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 8 (2009) (“Data in the Washtenaw County
and Wayne County studies have demonstrated high expectations and demands for scientific
evidence among jurors. Other scholars and researchers have found similarly high expectations and
regard for scientific evidence by jurors.”).
Researchers typically reason that jurors evaluate complicated expert testimony either by (1)
evaluating the logic of the testimony itself and trying to understand the underlying science (i.e.,
“central processing”), or when that is difficult, (2) reverting to shortcuts, heuristics, or other means
of evaluating the testimony (i.e., “peripheral processing”), which includes things like the credentials
of the expert, how much the expert has been paid, or even the expert’s manner of speech or
appearance. See Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert Testimony:
Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 441, 448 (2003) (“Cooper and
Neuhaus concluded that jurors shifted from central to peripheral processing under cognitively
challenging conditions.”).
Id. at 458.
Id. at 448 (“[M]ock jurors who heard testimony of a highly paid expert with high credentials—
potentially fitting the profile of a hired gun—rated the expert as less likable, less believable, less
trustworthy, less honest, and more annoying . . . .”).
Id. at 473 (“This shows that the common litigator tactic of pointing to differences between
deposition and trial testimony can be effective in decreasing credibility.”).
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CONCLUSION
Machine learning is already in our email clients, our web applications,
our law firms, and our government’s regulatory agencies. It will soon arrive
in our courtrooms, too. When it does, it will only be the latest in a long line
of machine evidence that is admitted in spite of the risk of error it carries.
While machine learning poses some risks under Federal Rule of Evidence
702—namely that its data must be appropriately compiled and relevant to
the given defendant—nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence inherently
bars machine learning output as a form of evidence. For its part, the
Constitution and relevant precedent permit machine learning evidence even
in spite of its unexplainability, even if the Sixth Amendment merely requires
that the evidence be introduced with expert testimony.

